Regional inequalities and tools for development and "catching-up"
László Andor
is an associate professor at the Budapest University of Economic
Sciences and Public Administration. This article is adapted
from a paper he presented to the Summer School on the Enlargement
of the European Union organised by the French foundation Confrontation
in Budapest, June 27-28, 2002.
Introduction
Finance and labour are not unrelated issues
of the economy. Business in a modern market economy means a
combination of various factors of production, and particularly
labour and capital. Development, however, is an uneven process,
and the market system produces areas with capital shortages
and areas with labour shortages. In such cases of regional imbalance,
one of the two factors must move in order to facilitate economic
progress.
In terms of regional development, the movement
of capital plays a much greater role than the movement of labour.
The flow of labour is a solution for individuals and their families,
but it does not improve the chances for development in the region
with labour surplus. The impact of capital import is not comparable
to labour outflow, which can even undermine attempts by an underdeveloped
region to catch up.
In the EU context, much has been said about
the obstacles to labour mobility but, from the considerations
above, we must say the problems with capital mobility are much
greater. The transition in the East has displayed a typical
market failure. In a period of transformation, crisis, major
imbalance and lack of transparency, capital is reluctant to
move, and capitalists are reluctant to invest. Hence, there
is a need for government intervention and financial innovation
in order to generate economic growth.
Finance
When the Berlin Wall was just about to fall,
the West (i.e. the European Community
and the US) immediately recognised that financial innovation
is essential for the proper treatment of post-communist countries.
This recognition resulted in the establishment of the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) as early as 1990.
Jacques Attali, advisor for Francois Mitterrand, the Socialist
President of France, was father of the project, and became first
head of the new international institution. In the early period
of the market transition, EBRD supported East-Central Europe's
attempts to adjust to the new environment. After a few years,
EBRD went further East to find new and deserving clients. However,
the problems were not over so quickly in East-Central Europe.
The Cold War was followed by a Cold Peace, when political friendship
was accompanied with extreme economic rigour.
The economic consequences of the Cold War
and the Cold Peace remained with us much longer than expected
by most experts in the early 1990s. We have no reason to be
triumphant more than ten years after the transition began. The
level of GDP has just reached the 1989 level in the year 2000
in Hungary, and only Poland displayed a faster relative growth
rate in the region throughout the 1990s. Until the very end
of the 1990s, living standards declined for the majority of
the population of East-Central Europe.
Having seen the disappointing consequences
of transition in progress, the debate as to whether there should
be a new 'Marshall Plan' emerged time after time. The official
response arrived on the 50th anniversary of the original
Marshall Plan from President Bill Clinton. He said: No,
foreign private investment does the job. The problem,
however, is that foreign private investment does not necessarily
contribute to the catching-up process in the long-run, and it
rather deepens regional inequalities (see Hungary and Poland
in the recent decade). There is no strong correlation between
the amount of foreign capital import and GDP growth in a given
country.
For successful catching-up patterns, we
have to look to East Asia, where the market system developed
on the basis of a model that gave a significant role to special
financial arrangements under public control. One can even claim
that only favourable public finance can give hope for underdeveloped
regions, though even that is clearly no guarantee, and mobilise
domestic capital for a successful period of catching-up. The
example of certain East-Asian countries, such as Japan and more
recently South-Korea and Taiwan, clearly supports this argument.
The East-Asian experience
showed that state-owned development banks are essential instruments
of national development and catching-up (particularly, but not
exclusively, in developing infrastructure). True, these institutions
raise the risk of corruption, and not only in East-Asia. The
fundamental question is whether development banks function under
the guidelines of national development plans, which is a new
endeavour in Hungary after more than ten years of economic transition.
Money
In the wake of the economic transformation,
currency devaluation has been a main source of economic competitiveness
in the countries of East-Central Europe. It should not be any
longer, and it cannot be any longer, particularly after we join
the EMU. Stabilising the exchange rate is already a general
purpose of economic policies in the region. We have to understand,
however, that monetary convergence is taking place in a period
when the framework of economic policy is being rearranged in
other areas too. Abolishing hitherto existing tax benefits simultaneously
with real appreciation of currencies can cause a major problem
in the near future, and lead to a crisis of disinvestment in
the accession countries.
The timing and arrangement of EMU accession
is therefore a vital issue for economic competitiveness in the
new Eastern members of the Union. Exchange rates can be mismanaged,
as in Poland and Hungary, by the endeavour to produce impressive
inflation rates. At the same time they may undermine international
competitiveness. These risks of destabilisation demand special
monetary arrangements for the Eastern zone. A carefully designed
and operated ERM-II is clearly in the interest of a future Eastern
zone, and it could as well be implemented before EU accession
takes place. (The point is to provide
assistance to exchange rate stability for countries dependent
on EU trade.)
Another hard job for the new member states
is to meet the Maastricht criteria. When convergence began in
the West, cohesion funds were introduced for peripheral countries
in order to allow them to continue economic growth and retain
the chance of catching up. Those countries were actually in
much better shape than the Eastern newcomers are at the moment.
The special needs of the East must therefore be appreciated
if convergence is meant to be a complex process beyond law and
finance. Pushing up the total sums of aid is not the only solution
of this equation. One can easily imagine that the EU would create
a more favourable set of conditions by lowering the rate of
domestic contribution to financing projects with EU subsidies.
Conclusion
Financial innovation and special monetary
arrangements continue to be important ingredients of economic
development, and they are vital for the catching-up process
of East-Central Europe. Eventually a larger EU budget must be
created to hold a diverse union together. We are obviously aware
of the political obstacles to any budget increase in the EU,
but we also have to be aware of the economic necessity of creating
a larger EU budget after a single market and a single currency
have been introduced. The EU has been very successful in striking
a balance between economic necessity and political obstacles
in the past, so it will surely manage this in the future as
well. In order to guide concessional finance, a European investment
policy must be developed. To a large extent this is already
part of the European model, and it should be strengthened deliberately.
Europe cannot base its future on convergence to the American
model of capitalism. Labour mobility will never be so high in
Europe as it is in the US. Consequently, capital must be made
more mobile and more responsible than it is in the United States
of America.
László Andor is author
of Market Failure (Pluto
Press, 1999)