July 15, 2006 15:06 |
by Susan George
Susan George was recently asked to speak at a conference on "Social
Europe: Social Cohesion and Wellbeing". This is what she had
to say.
Professor José-Félix Tezanos, Director of the Fundacion
Sistema and editor of its periodical Revista Temas has organised
several years running an Encuentro [colloquium, or 'meeting, encounter']
in the exceptionally beautiful Spanish university city of Salamanca.
This year, the second time I've gone, the Encuentros were devoted
to the subject "What course for Europe" ["El Rumbo
de l'Europa"] and my paper below more or less lets fly against
everything I think is wrong with Europe as presently organised.
I remain a convinced European and live in hope that we may manage
to build a genuinely democratic European Union, no matter how badly
it may have started out.
The Salamanca Encuentros roundtable in which I have been asked
to participate is titled Social Europe: Social Cohesion and Wellbeing.
My contribution will argue that Europe is not promoting social cohesion
but, to the contrary, is fast travelling towards social dislocation
and a lower degree of wellbeing than in the past. This outcome is
not an accident but reflects, rather, deliberate policy choices,
designed to promote neo-liberal, market-oriented "solutions"
whose impact is not merely predictable but dire.
The Wrong Road
The European Commission is the executor of these policies, with
the collusion of the great majority of European member States, all
of which are influenced by business and financial elites whose lobbies
are omnipresent in Brussels. Europe has chosen neo-liberalism as
its guiding principle and has therefore simultaneously chosen to
sacrifice social cohesion to market- friendly options. The proposed
Constitutional Treaty for Europe, quite rightly rejected by the
peoples of France and the Netherlands, would have set this direction
in stone. Thanks to the defeat of the Constitution-whose cadaver
the Commission is nonetheless trying to resuscitate--Europeans still
have a slim chance to shape their future in a more positive direction,
but the window of opportunity is both narrow and rapidly shrinking.
It is therefore difficult to be optimistic in this regard but our
need for a better politics and a liveable Europe for our children
demands that we at least try.
Spaniards mostly either abstained from voting in their national
referendum on the Constitution or voted Yes as a kind of reflex.
The dominant logic seems to have been: [1] This document is about
Europe; [2] Europe is A Good Thing; therefore [3] I will vote "Yes"
[or not bother to vote at all]. There was little or no debate within
the country and critical examination of the text was not, to say
the least, encouraged. As Minister Lopez Aguilar remarked, "One
does not need to read the Constitution to know that it is good".
This is not a condemnation of the Spaniards. Even the most cursory
knowledge of recent history helps one to understand that, from the
Spanish point of view, the advent of Europe and the advent of Spanish
democracy roughly coincide; that Europe has for many years contributed
to Spanish GNP at the rate of at least one percent a year and that
the Spanish vote was highly determined by Spain's own national political
experience. The result was that the Spanish people followed the
Minister's advice and did not generally read the document itself-they
just assumed that it was, as he put it, "good". Spaniards
are furthermore astonished, at least in my experience, when they
learn what the Constitutional Treaty they were asked to vote on
actually contained.
Let me make clear that the criticisms expressed here concerning
the proposed Constitution and Europe's present orientation do not
in any way imply criticism of Spain, Spaniards or the Spanish vote.
It does mean, however, that Spaniards, as well as other Europeans,
would do well to take a serious second look at the path Europe has
embarked upon and join with each other in attempting to construct
the Europe of Social Cohesion and Wellbeing being put forward in
Salamanca, in my view both optimistically and prematurely.
Why Reject the Proposed Constitution?
Many things were wrong with the European Constitutional Treaty
[ECT](1) . Normally, a Constitution should be drafted by people
democratically elected for that purpose [a Constituent Assembly].
The document should be relatively short and confine itself to stating
general principles and to a description of executive, legislative
and judicial powers and the separations, checks and balances between
them; as well as setting out the rights and duties of citizens.
A Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, should be above
all comprehensible to the people it is intended to govern. Finally,
it should be amendable. As the French Constitution of 1793 said,
"One generation should not have the right to prescribe laws
for succeeding generations". Such a basic, solemn document
as a Constitution should not be too easy to amend, but nor should
it be too difficult. Times change and laws, after careful consideration,
should sometimes change with them.
On all these criteria, the European Constitution fails. It was
drafted by 105 people appointed for the task [the "Convention"].
Some members were, of course, elected officials serving in national
parliaments or the European Parliament, but they were not elected
for the purpose of drafting a Constitution and arguably they did
not adequately represent European opinion. Electing a Constituent
Assembly would have created a Europe-wide debate, whereas the actual
proceedings were carried out in an opaque way, with most Europeans
unaware that drafting was even going on. Furthermore, the members
of the Convention could only amend texts set before them by the
Presidency [Valery Giscard d'Estaing and his immediate colleagues].
They could not even make inputs of their own. Some European parliamentary
groups like the Socialists tried, and failed, to have certain proposals
accepted, whereas citizens had zero input. Those who did draft the
text had no discernible interest in promoting social cohesion or
citizens' welfare so it is not surprising that these do not figure
in the text.
This text was nonetheless enormously long: 232 pages in the official
French version, plus several hundred pages of annexes and protocols.
In contrast, at 58 pages, the Spanish Constitution is already quite
long as national constitutions go, and comes to about 18.000 words.
The Constitution of the United States is about 5000 words long and
has been in force since 1787 because it is amendable and can be
adjusted for the needs of each generation through judicial interpretation.
The ECT must hold some sort of record for length but also for complexity.
It is full of cross-references so that one cannot understand many
important articles without referring to other articles; themselves
sometimes referring to still others. Reading this document seriously
means cutting through a whole maquis, a jungle of superposed prescriptions
which ultimately give the most important powers to the unelected
Commission. Anyone without a higher education would be hard put
to read it; a law degree would be good preparation.
That the French made the effort to decode this immensely complicated
text, despite all the efforts of the government and the major political
parties telling them not to bother, is to their credit. Some organisations
like Attac, working with others in the 900-some citizen collectives
that sprang up all over the country, also carried out the work of
educating ordinary citizens, helping them to penetrate the maquis
and to understand the real content of the ECT. Finally, the ECT
would have been almost impossible to amend or invalidate, requiring
a triple unanimity of the Convention, the Council of twenty-five
member States and their twenty-five parliaments.
Business, financial, media and political elites in France were
all in favour of the ECT and they were relentless in their campaign
for the Yes. Even the so-called public service media invited news
and talk-show commentators in a ratio of 3 or 4 for the Yes to each
commentator for the No. The employers associations [MEDEF or, at
the European level, UNICE]. The government, as well as the leadership
of the socialist party attempted to frighten the electorate, predicting
chaos unless the Yes won.
A Charter for Neo-liberalism
The elites had good reason to favour the ECT: it was designed to
serve the needs of those at the top of society. Normally, popular
sovereignty has been the basis of every constitution since the American
and French Revolutions but in this one the people were entirely
absent; their sovereignty was never recognised. A Constitutional
preamble typically begins with "We the People
."
or a similar phrase: the ECT begins with "His Majesty, King
of the Belgians" and goes on to list the heads of State and
government before getting around to mentioning the people in the
fourth or fifth paragraph, as a kind of afterthought.
These apparently formal or symbolic arrangements are echoed throughout
the text. Why can one argue that this Constitution embodies the
anti-social cohesion point of view now dominant in Europe? Is it
not significant that the phrase "free and undistorted competition"
recurs 24 times, beginning with Article I-3 describing the objectives
of the Union? Competition may be a good tool in some cases, at some
times and in some national contexts but it is only a tool and cannot
be enshrined as a general principle, as is the case in the ECT.
Any knowledgeable economist can explain that in his profession,
"competition" has at least five different meanings.(2)
It is extremely dangerous to include competition as one of the
guiding principles of a political document. Even worse, it may not
even work for economies. As French economist Jacques Sapir points
out:
An argument setting up competition as a central principle of economic
organisation is 'false' in the sense that various scientific discourses
have been proven false throughout history
.the discourse of
those who defend competition as a central principle is the equivalent,
in economics, of defending anti-darwinist theories and creationism.
In any event, the ECT is full of detailed economic prescriptions
and such prescriptions have no place in a constitutional document.
Aside from the ECT, the only recent historical example where one
finds such precise guidelines for running the economy is the Stalinist
Constitution of the Soviet Union, drafted by the Politburo in 1936.
While the USSR 1936 Constitution is naturally full of collectivist
wisdom, the ECT proposes "free and undistorted competition"
as a goal of Europe, on the same level as peace and wellbeing of
the population; it is of the same nature as liberty, security and
justice. [Article I, 3].
Other Articles hammer home again and again the need for free trade,
freedom of investment and the primacy of the market-the word "market"
recurs 78 times in the text. One might argue that Europe's prosperity
and therefore the economic wellbeing of its citizens depends on
free circulation of goods, services, capital and people, as the
ECT constantly repeats. But when one discovers just how the Commission
understands and plans to implement such "free circulation",
one also understands that the wellbeing of citizens has nothing
to do with it.
The Bolkestein directive on the free circulation of people within
Europe provides a good example. Before it had to be substantially
modified due to public outcry, this directive actually set out to
organise one major contributing factor to social breakdown by prescribing
an entirely new legal principle called the "country of origin".
According to this principle, a worker from one of the ten newly
acceded countries [or even workers from outside the EU with a valid
work permit in any of the 25 member States] would be free to work
in another European country under the laws obtaining in his or her
own country of origin. The receiving country would not even have
the right to be informed of the presence of foreign workers on its
soil; no declaration to any authorities, including work inspectors,
social security or the like was deemed necessary.
Inside the European Union of 25, wage differentials may differ
by a factor of ten or twelve to one and social protection laws show
equally wide variations. The initial directive, as wary European
citizens fortunately understood, was an invitation to capital to
organise the "race to the bottom", and to bring masses
of poor Eastern Europeans, prepared to work at almost any price,
into the more developed Western States. Many Europeans remain convinced
that the goal of the Bolkestein Directive was at least partially
to break down social cohesion in countries that have achieved some
measure of it by making workers' lives more precarious.
Why Trust these People?
It is small wonder that recent polls show that Europeans do not
particularly trust European institutions, or are at best neutral
towards them. They are quite clear, however, that business has a
great deal of clout with European institutions. Asked if business
influences the EU, 79 percent replied Yes, business influences the
EU either strongly or fairly strongly. In the newly acceding countries,
87 percent thought business had a strong or fairly strong influence.
On the other hand, NGOs were [correctly] perceived by 59 percent
to have little or no influence on the EU.
The European respondents to this survey were quite right to point
to business influence: the number of lobbyists in Brussels is estimated
at about 15.000 of which the huge majority represent business interests
and only about ten percent of them represent NGOs or regional European
interests. So far, the Commission has successfully resisted passing
any law which would require lobbyists to register, although such
requirements exist even in the ultra-liberal United States.
The same survey posed questions to which the choice of answers
was Trust/Do Not Trust/Neutral. Between 29 and 37 percent of respondents
express trust for the European Union, the European Parliament, the
European Commission, and the Council of Ministers; a consistent
20 percent express no trust and 44 to 52 percent are neutral. To
say the least, in the kindest interpretation, Europe is not well
understood and only about a third of respondents harbour a positive
sentiment of trust towards its institutions.(3)
The Blueprint for Social Dislocation
The European Constitution showed its neo-liberal colours especially
in its treatment of public services, or rather what it termed Services
of General Economic Interest. Articles III-166 to 168 literally
organise the demise of public services and the right of member States
to provide subsidies. These services are made explicitly subject
to the rules of competition. If the Commission decides that the
aid given by a member State to a public enterprise is incompatible
with the rules of the internal market [demanding "free and
undistorted competition"], it can order the guilty State to
eliminate or modify the subsidy.
A decision to accept a subsidy and to consider it compatible with
the rules of the internal market in any given member country must
be unanimously approved by all 25 member States. Whenever the determinants
of social cohesion are involved, the lowest common denominator is
systematically applied. Thus Articles III-168 through 175 make it
virtually impossible to harmonise fiscal policy or social or environmental
legislation-at least to harmonise them upwards. Unanimity is generally
required and the unelected Commission remains the final judge of
national choices. If this Constitution were in force, it could thus
dismantle environmental as well as social protection measures. Given
the tenor of this particular Commission, undoubtedly the most neo-liberal
in European Union history, one is quite sure it will still try to
do so whatever the fate of the ECT. The market must decide!
Tax rates inside the EU are also widely disparate. Most of the
newly acceded States have opted for "flat taxes" of between
10 and 18 percent; these rates apply to businesses, personal consumption
and revenues. In contrast, French and German corporate taxes, for
example, are more than 30 percent. Under these circumstances, and
since unanimity is required in matters of fiscal harmonisation,
it is clear that only downward harmonisation can ever be adopted--for
the simple reason that low-tax member States see their fiscal policy
as a comparative advantage for attracting foreign direct investment
and for competing in international markets.
This suits the neo-liberals perfectly: as the famously neo-liberal
Frits Bolkestein remarked, it is very difficult to reach agreement
on tax questions so the best corporate tax rate that European countries
could set would be ideally zero.(4) The ETC contains 448 articles:
not one of them calls for anything but tax and social-policy competition.
No space is provided to set a European-wide minimum salary nor to
harmonise salaries upwards, but nothing forbids setting them below
the poverty line. That is exactly where they will tend to go under
present European leadership.
Capital, on the other hand, enjoys complete freedom to do as it
pleases. Any restriction on capital flows within the Union, or even
with regard to non-EU members, must be agreed unanimously. Article
III-314 on European trade policy is worth quoting:
"
..the Union contributes in the common interest to
the harmonious development of world trade, to the progressive dismantling
of restrictions on international exchange and on foreign direct
investment and to reducing tariff and other barriers."
These objectives are precisely the ones that were sought by neo-liberals
in the Multilateral Agreement on Investment [MAI, defeated in 1998]
and which they are still seeking through the World Trade Organisation.
In the case of Article III-314, the EU was not just legislating
for its own members but for the world, attempting to pry open markets
everywhere. So far, Trade Commissioners Lamy and Mandelson have
based their demands within the WTO and in bilateral or regional
trade agreements on this philosophy. Total freedom of capital movements
and totally free trade bring into play what David Ricardo called
in 1817 the "iron law of wages". Wages tend to be reduced
to subsistence levels when many workers living in societies at very
different levels of social development are placed in competition
with each other. Nothing has changed since the early nineteenth
century and at last the capitalist class, working through the European
institutions, sees its opportunity for revenge against the gains
of workers over the past several decades.
The Elements of Social Cohesion
What would be the constitutive elements of European social cohesion?
At the very least, the first requirement would be that the EU not
attempt to destroy what remains of it in individual member States.
One cannot count on Europe to do so. The ECT was a blueprint for
forcing governments to discourage or dismantle many national institutions
still contributing to social cohesion.
Surely the presence or absence of public services plays a part
in the wellbeing of citizens. In societies where public services
are of low quality or entirely absent, inequalities are necessarily
higher and the "social wage" is reduced. Laws concerning
social protection, minimum wages, limitations on work time, workplace
safety and job security are important elements of social cohesion
as well. Countries where the prevailing social logic is "every
man [or woman] for himself/herself" are high-risk societies
whose members are too busy trying to take care of themselves and
their families to care much about each other and the overall condition
of their society.
Much was made of Part II of the European Constitutional Treaty,
the so-called Charter of Fundamental Rights. The advocates of a
Yes vote claimed it would repair anything that might otherwise be
wrong with the ECT. In fact, a careful examination of the Charter
shows that it is not a progressive instrument but regressive with
regard to several national constitutions [and certainly to the French
Constitution of 1958].
Take the right to free education: this right is guaranteed in the
Charter only for obligatory education, which in France is from the
ages of 6 to 16. What about kindergarden? What about the last years
of high school, the final prep class for the baccalaureat, the university?
These too are free in many countries, including France.(5) What
makes anyone believe that Europe can be the "competitive"
society touted by the loudly trumpeted "Lisbon Strategy",
which itself calls for a huge effort in higher education, when these
levels are not available to all and people can be excluded on grounds
of family revenues? Furthermore, many specialists of early childhood
education say "Everything is decided before the age of six".
How are we to integrate our immigrant populations if small children
have no prior apprenticeship in the local language and customs before
starting the "official"-and free-classes at age six? This
Article [II-74] is an invitation to a class society, structured
along financial lines.
The following Charter Article [II-75] guarantees the right to work
and to choose a profession. All well and good, but in the French
wording at least, what the Article means is that if you can find
a job, you have the right to work, period. The second paragraph
makes this clear: "Any citizen of the Union has the right to
look for a job". Since the right to a job is also the basis
in law for the right to unemployment compensation, and since the
EU does not recognise this right elsewhere, one wonders how social
cohesion can be achieved when such a universal need is not admitted
in law.
The Charter also forbids discrimination based on sex, race, colour,
social or ethnic origins, genetic characteristics, language, religion
or convictions, political or other opinions, belonging to a national
minority, fortune, birth, handicap, age or sexual orientation [II-81].
This list would seem to cover absolutely every possible source of
discrimination. But should one cheer? Not too soon, because when
one gets into the serious part of the Constitution, which is to
say Part III, one learns [III-124] that an actual law making such
discrimination effectively illegal must be unanimously approved
by all the member States, some of which have laws which do not outlaw
discrimination [against national minorities for instance] and are
not likely to give them up.
The Union "respects the right of old people to lead a decent
and independent life and to participate in social and cultural life"-but
people of other ages aren't mentioned. Strikes are authorised in
the Charter, but employers are also given the right to lock-out
[III-210, 6] a "right" which is specifically outlawed
in the French Constitution, for example. This same, long Article
III-210 is perhaps the best demonstration of the will in the higher
spheres of Europe to discourage social cohesion. The text also specifies
that unanimity is required for any law pertaining to social security
and social protection of workers; for protection of workers in case
of an end to their job contract; collective representation and defence
of workers' interests as well as many other important social questions.
Social Cohesion Costs Money
More proof of the will of Europe to move towards social dislocation
through neo-liberal policies is to be found in its financial and
monetary policies. Quite simply stated, if Europe wants social cohesion
and social wellbeing, these must be paid for. They are not going
to fall out of the sky or appear by magic, particularly in circumstances
where the ten new countries, for obvious historical reasons, find
themselves at a much lower level of social development than the
fifteen others. Look at the amount Germany has spent on bringing
East Germany up to the level of the West [an effort not yet entirely
successful despite the billions of euros invested]. Look at the
structural funds supplied to Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain and
other regions like Southern Italy. Even within the early EU member-States
countries, people have to be protected against the ravages of the
market and of globalisation; they must be able to count on quality
education and health care; they must have access to decent work
and to compensation when unable to work; they should have adequate
retirement plans.
Unfortunately, nothing in the present Treaty [Nice, the one we
are presently living under] nor in the proposed Constitution provides
any hope that Europe will give itself the means to carry out any
of the indispensable tasks necessary for its citizens' wellbeing.
The absence of such material resources will give the "market
solution" primacy over social ones, and that is precisely what
the Commission and the European elites hope for. Meanwhile, the
ability of individual member States to provide for social measures
within their borders is being steadily eroded by EU policy. Let
us look briefly at what would be required to provide Europeans with
social protection, wellbeing and cohesion.
The Vital Elements
A realistic budget: Europe's budget is limited to 1.04 percent
of GDP. Even the United States, not noted for its social generosity,
spends 20 of the Federal budget [and the States spend a great deal
more] on the wellbeing of citizens.
Taxes: Unlike most normal parliaments, the European parliament
has no power to levy taxes [it does not even have the power to introduce
legislation, but that is another, equally sad, story]. Even a one
percent tax on corporate profits would go some way to rectifying
this situation, but this would probably be forbidden by the constant
insistence on the "freedom of capital" to do as it pleases.
A Central Bank under political supervision and with a broader mandate:
Unlike virtually any other Central Bank in the world, with the possible
exception of New Zealand's, the European Central Bank is completely
independent of any political control and its chief is appointed
for nine years. The Bank's only mandate is to control inflation
[by raising interest rates]. According to many reputable economists,
it has at times raised interest rates without any economic justification,
without a sign of inflation in sight. This Bank is not required
to worry about economic expansion, full employment or any other
policy which would increase the wellbeing of ordinary citizens.
High interest rates and zero inflation do, however, satisfy the
desires of shareholders and rentiers.
A capacity to borrow: Every country in the world is able to issue
bonds. These bonds may be more or less risky, of greater or lesser
value, but the right of the governments in question to issue them
is not in doubt. The European Union cannot borrow, even though,
considering its economic standing, its bonds would undoubtedly be
rated triple AAA--that is, of top investment grade. How, then, does
it plan to improve and integrate its infrastructure, invest in research
and higher education [which the "Lisbon Strategy" claims
is indispensable for its future]; put in place Europe-wide clean
energy and environmental policies or carry out any other indispensable
projects?
A monetary policy geared toward economic expansion: Here again,
as with the mandate of the Central Bank, the "Stability and
Growth Pact" is narrowly conceived, interested only in punishing
member countries whose rate of inflation or accumulated debt is
judged by the neo-liberal Commission to be getting out of hand.
This is T-Shirt Europe: One size fits all.
A decent solidarity fund for the newly acceded countries: This
is not slated to happen either [no budget, no borrowing] and the
ten newcomers will be kept for the foreseeable future as reservoirs
of cheap labour and good places to delocalise industry so as to
push down wages everywhere. The 10 new countries will not get the
same treatment as previous arrivals, including Spain. Forty percent
of the already insufficient budget is still spent on the Common
Agricultural Policy, mostly to provide extra income for the richest
farmers.
A Eurogroup with some political courage: Theoretically, the Eurogroup,
made up of the finance ministers of the twelve Euro countries, could
alleviate some of these deficiencies-it could, if it wanted to,
launch bonds and adopt common infrastructure policies; it would
take a major political fight but it could also, probably, instate
taxes on corporations and on capital flows. No signs of any such
thing are visible.
Utopia
The rest of this contribution will content itself with what should
happen rather than what is actually happening. For that reason,
it can be seen as utopian, at least temporarily.
The first question to ask in defining a Euro-topia is to ask Why?
The best reason to construct another model in Europe, a Europe of
social wellbeing [which I call Europe of the Common Good] (6) is
simply because no one else is going to do it. Nothing can be expected
of the United States in this regard; its model is neo-liberal to
the core. The Chinese model so far displays the worst features of
both neo-liberalism and Communism. Some Latin American countries
[Venezuela and now Bolivia] are attempting something along the lines
of a social-cohesion model but a truly social model cannot be generalised
to the whole of Latin America which does not boast enough abundant
and expensive natural resources like Venezuela's and Bolivia's oil
and gas.
So either Europe pulls itself together and creates a continent-wide
social and ecological model which could be an example for the entire
world--which it could then help the entire world to follow--or no
one does. (7) Europe has 450 million people and a GDP slightly larger
than that of the United States; it has a highly educated and healthy
population; it has traditions of social struggle and emancipation
and all its members are now democracies. With all these advantages,
it could afford to be ambitious.
Elements of the Euro-topian model would include:
* Cheap fast trains and cheap or cost-free internet for all; public
services on principles of same cost to all, for all, regardless
of distance, and integrated across the continent;
* Quality free education for all the youngest Europeans, but especially
for immigrant children, as soon as they are out of their nappies;
* Quality free higher education limited only by individual capacity,
plus a policy of permanent adult education and retraining;
* Important investment in science and a concerted effort to bring
home the 400.000 European scientists, educated at European expense,
now resident in the United States-which means providing them with
good labs and good salaries;
* A Europe-wide guaranteed minimum salary and unemployment benefits;
* Universal health and maternity care;
* Reducing military expenditures [of which the proposed ECT demanded
an increase] but integrating our defence and investing in intelligence
and peacekeeping forces;
* A European defense force making its own political decisions [the
ECT placed European member countries under the command of NATO];
* A rapid increase of the Development aid budget to the 0.70 of
GNP that the United Nations has been requesting for over thirty
years; simultaneous cancellation of all developing country debts;
respect for all nations' food sovereignty;
* A policy of "reinforced cooperation" among its members
so that those States which wanted to move more quickly or more deeply
towards harmonisation of fiscal or social policies could do so,
while always remaining open to newcomers;
* A policy of "concentric circles" in order to provide
special cooperation with countries like Turkey, the North Africans
and other Mediterranean countries, Sub-Saharan Africa;
* An all-out investment in environment-friendly technologies and
architecture; alternative energies, energy and water conservation
policies; city and regional environmental planning.
How can we go about achieving the Euro-topia of our dreams? The
only viable answer is through greater democracy, through more confidence
in the views of European citizens and through opening new vistas,
including corporations, to democratic practice. This means, above
all, democratising European structures-particularly the Commission
and the Parliament--an aim which the proposed Constitution certainly
did not achieve.
European elites, particularly the Commission, were surprised and
furious at the results of the French and Dutch referenda. Their
attitude was summed up by Commission Vice President Gunther Verheugen,
whose reaction to these votes was quoted in the Financial Times:
"We must not give in to blackmail". So much for the principle
of universal suffrage. Verheugen and those who think like him, would
be far happier to see a Europe where all public services were privatised,
all labour was "flexible" and all human activities-including
health, education, culture, water and so on-were sources of profit.
Social cohesion and wellbeing do not enter into their equation
and the sooner this is recognised, the better position we shall
be in to fight back. This is the challenge of the coming decades
and the task will demand the efforts of all European peoples. We
must hope that they can unite in the defence of democracy, in the
knowledge that "Another Europe is Possible".
Susan George was speaking at the Encuentros de Salamanca, which
took place on 21-23 June 2006
Notes
1. The reader should know that my own knowledge of the Constitution
is based on the French version of the official text "Traite
Etablissant une Constitution pour l'Europe". Any translations
or renditions in English are my own and not necessarily the official
wording.
2. See Jacques Sapir, " La Fin de l'Euro-liberalisme",
Eds. Le Seuil, Paris, 2006, especially Chapter 1 and p. 55
3. Penn, Schoen and Berland Associates, "Survey of European
Citizens" conducted in May 2006 and dated 25 May 2006.
4. See Jacques Genereux, Manuel critique du parfait Europeen, Eds.
Le Seuil, Paris, 2005 p.81 who quotes Bolkestein on the matter of
taxes.
5. A personal note here: I completed a Licence ès Philosophie
in 1967 at the Sorbonne and earned a PhD at the Ecole des Hautes
Etudes en Sciences sociales, also part of the Sorbonne, in 1978.
Both degrees, which took about three years each, cost me the equivalent
of about 100 euros a year.
6. See Nous, Peuples d'Europe [Paris, Eds. Fayard,2005], forthcoming
in Spanish with Icaria Editorial
7.For a much longer development of this theme, see Susan George,
Another World is Possible If
. [Verso, London and New York,
2004] in Spanish Otro Mundo es Posible Si
. [Icaria Editorial
and Intermon, Barcelona, 2004] and Nous, Peuples d'Europe as above
See Susan George's
homepage
See also
http://www.spectrezine.org/europe/Erik.htm