April 10, 2005 17:15 | by Frank
Andrews
Using the example of the UK, Frank Andrews looks at how social
security systems might be made fairer, more effective and more efficient.
Introduction
As the proportion of people over sixty years old in EU countries
increases, something of a panic has set in concerning how to provide
adequate pensions. The thesis of this article is that this problem
cannot be solved by tinkering at the edges of the tax/benefit systems.
A fundamental overhaul of social security is needed to solve the
problem. The growing numbers of over-60s can wield a formidable
amount of political influence in democracies, so it makes no sense
to treat them as a marginalized group - in some countries they already
constitute over a quarter of the adult population and this proportion
is set to grow further. The danger is that the solidarity that exists
between generations will be fractured by demographic pressures and
I am therefore proposing a more inclusive tax/benefit system composed
of three main parts:
1) A citizens' income 2) Special benefits for disability, childcare,
housing costs, and community care. 3) An improved regime for occupational
pension, private pensions and savings.
This analysis relates mainly to Britain but could be adapted to
be relevant to all economically developed societies.
Citizens' Income
The idea of a citizens' income is of course not a new one, but
in this version its major contribution would be to supersede state
retirement pension and the plethora of contributory and means-tested
benefits with the exceptions that I will outline in the second section
of this article. in the UK, for example, It would allow for the
abolition of the National Insurance Scheme and a vast amount of
central government bureaucracy. It would integrate social security
provision for over ninety per cent of the population.
It is envisaged that all citizens over eighteen years old would
automatically qualify for a citizens' income set initially at the
rate of the single person's guaranteed pension credit - at present
about £430 pm, about Euros 650. Other countries would need
to set a suitable rate, taking into account national income and
the cost of living. This would be upgraded on an annual basis in
line with the increase in average earnings. It would be tax free
and disregarded for means testing.
The citizens' income would be administered by the state fiscal
services and would be subject to the following restrictions on its
universality:
(i) A clawback would be instituted on a tapered basis when an individual's
income exceeded a certain amount - in the case of the UK in 2005,
this would be around £2,500 pm (Euros 3,800) gradually tapering
to nil at £5,000. There would be no limits on capital. The
claw back would be integrated into the income tax system.
(ii) Overseas workers would be able to qualify for the citizens'
income after a period of proven income tax contributions to be determined
by reciprocal agreements with non-member states and either bilateral
arrangements between member states or, ideally, an agreement at
EU level.
(iii) People over sixty would be paid their citizens' income if
they went to live overseas without a time limit as long as they
had a proven income tax record of at least 10 years before their
60th birthday. People under sixty would be subject to time limits
depending on reciprocal agreements and European Union rules if they
went abroad.
(iv) People in hospital for over 52 weeks would cease to be paid
until they were discharged. Also, people in permanent residential
care or nursing home care and prisoners would cease to be paid until
discharge.
I will deal with the consequences of some of these restrictions
in the next section but for the vast majority of citizens the citizens'
income would be a safety net to rely on throughout their adult lives.
Disability, Childcare, Housing Costs, and Community Care
In the British system, disability living allowance would be essentially
unchanged. It would be assessed on medical criteria as it is now
and would be tax free and disregarded as income for means tested
benefits. Child care assistance would be provided by a child benefit
which would be tax free and disregarded as income for means tested
benefits. If this was set at, say £120 a month, a single parent
with one child would be entitled to receive the citizens' income
of £424 on top of this. Child maintenance costs from an absent parent
would be disregarded as income. The citizens' income system would
facilitate the recovery of maintenance payments by the child support
agency because the absent parent would have to forego his or her
entitlement to citizens' income in order to evade paying maintenance.
Housing and related benefits could be consolidated into a single
housing costs benefit which would also include assistance with mortgage
interest. This would be means tested at the local authority level.
The local authorities would also be given funding and responsibility
for administering an expanded community care system. They would,
as at present, run the funding of residential and nursing home care
and also be responsible for hardship funds to alleviate the situation
of people not entitled to the citizens' income i.e. overseas workers
who fall sick before paying income tax for the qualifying period,
people recently discharged from hospital, ex-prisoners, etc. The
function would dove-tail with taking over the present responsibilities
of "the social fund" which gives out community care grants,
crisis loans, etc. All of these benefits would be means tested taking
into account the disregards on citizens' income, child care, and
disability living allowance.
Occupational Pensions, Private Pensions and Savings
The last ten years has produced a growing list of pension scandals
in the private sector from Robert Maxwell's criminal pillaging of
the Mirror Group occupational pension fund to Enron's elaborate
fraud in the USA and Parmalat in Europe, to the misleading methods
used to sell endowment policies and Equitable Life's near insolvency.
An independent observer could only conclude that the private sector
has proved unfit to deal with lifetime contributions to occupational
pensions and private pensions. Nevertheless, private companies will
continue to find pension provision useful in attracting and retaining
staff and workers will continue to want to provide for their retirement.
My proposal on occupational pensions is that in order to retain
tax breaks on contributions private companies would have to pay
into regional public schemes. The regional public schemes would
be based on the existing local government pension scheme amalgamated
with the teachers' pension scheme and a regionalised National Health
Service and civil service pension scheme. This would provide a strong
financial basis for the private firms to buy into. It would also
be possible to devise a system whereby contributions are easily
transferable geographically from region to region and also internally
with the fund in the event of redundancy, insolvency, takeover,
or merely changing jobs.
In this system employees' contributions would be secure and relatively
high standards of public pension schemes could be universalized.
Financial products which are aimed at providing income or lump
sums for the over 60s should be strictly regulated so that they
have to obtain prior approval by the financial services authority
before launching them on to an unsuspecting public. This approval
should be made more meaningful by an explicit liability imposed
on the financial services authority, and therefore the government,
to compensate for further losses not envisaged in the terms of the
products.
Incentives to save could also be improved by an extension of the
cash element in the individual savings accounts the full allowance
for tax free savings.
Affordability
The immediate reactions I expect to encounter to these proposals
are shock and horror at the costs involved; but consider the following:
The citizens' income would replace retirement pension, working
tax credit, child tax credit, pension credit, Job seekers allowance,
statutory sick pay, incapacity benefit, income support, and numerous
other benefits and their equivalents in other national systems.
The citizens' income card would virtually be a national identity
card and I would advocate mandatory jail sentences for employers
who fail to deduct income tax. The provision to establish a proven
tax record would provide a big incentive for overseas workers to
work legally. National Insurance and its equivalents would be abolished
along with the contributory benefits and this would be made fiscally
neutral by an equivalent increase in income tax and corporation
tax. All this would bear down on the "unofficial economy"
which contributes nothing to the treasury, and about which the European
Commission in particular has repeatedly expressed concern.
The entitlement to the citizens' income from the age of 18 would
also alleviate the problem of funding for students, reducing the
extent to which they would have to take out loans to support themselves
through higher education. This would result in the unquantifiable
benefit of encouraging higher education for students from poor backgrounds
and minimising the financial pressure on low income households of
putting their children through university.
Conclusion
I have attempted to outline an alternative social security system
that would integrate the age groups in society. It would also encourage
integration of immigrant labour into the official economy. It would
replace the present inadequate systems of contributory benefits
but would encourage lifetime contributions to a secure second pension;
it would be redistributive in that it would be funded by progressive
income tax and corporation tax. It would also be much simpler and
easier to understand in that broadly speaking the central government
would deal with benefits which are non means tested and local government
would deal with means testing, though of course this would vary
from country to country. Whilst it would not in itself be cheap
to run, it would significantly reduce the bureaucratic waste inherent
in the present ad hoc jumble of benefits and pensions, a particular
problem in the UK but one which to some extent afflicts almost all
systems. Hopefully the fact that it would be simple enough for people
to understand and fair enough to involve the whole population would
make the costs acceptable and not resented by the vast majority.
The author, Frank Andrews, is a Welfare Rights Officer in the
north west of England.
See also:
Pensions
Crisis?
Alternative
European Economic Policy