September 2, 2008 17:52 | by Ali Abunimah
From
the moment Georgia launched a surprise attack on the tiny breakaway
region of South Ossetia last week, prompting a fierce Russian counterattack,
Israel has been trying to distance itself
from
the conflict. This is understandable: with Georgian forces on the
retreat, large numbers of civilians killed and injured, and Russia's
fury unabated, Israel's deep involvement is severely embarrassing.
The collapse of the Georgian offensive represents not only a disaster
for that country and its US-backed leaders, but another blow to
the myth of Israel's military prestige and prowess. Worse, Israel
fears that Russia could retaliate by stepping up its military assistance
to Israel's adversaries including Iran.
"Israel is following with great concern the developments in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia and hopes the violence will end,"
its foreign ministry said, adding with uncharacteristic doveishness,
"Israel recognizes the territorial integrity of Georgia and
calls for a peaceful solution."
Tbilisi's top diplomat in Tel Aviv complained about the lackluster
Israeli response to his country's predicament and perhaps overestimating
Israeli influence, called for Israeli "diplomatic pressure
on Moscow." Just like Israel, the diplomat said, Georgia is
fighting a war on "terrorism." Israeli officials politely
told the Georgians that "the address for that type of pressure
was Washington" (Herb Keinon, "Tbilisi wants Israel to
pressure Russia," The Jerusalem Post, 11 August 2008).
While Israel was keen to downplay its role, Georgia perhaps hoped
that flattery might draw Israel further in. Georgian minister Temur
Yakobashvili -- whom the Israeli daily Haaretz stressed was Jewish
-- told Israeli army radio that "Israel should be proud of
its military which trained Georgian soldiers." Yakobashvili
claimed rather implausibly, according to Haaretz, that "a small
group of Georgian soldiers were able to wipe out an entire Russian
military division, thanks to the Israeli training" ("Georgian
minister tells Israel Radio: Thanks to Israeli training, we're fending
off Russian military," Haaretz, 11 August 2008).
Since 2000, Israel has sold hundreds of millions of dollars in
arms and combat training to Georgia. Weapons included guns, ammunition,
shells, tactical missile systems, antiaircraft systems, automatic
turrets for armored vehicles, electronic equipment and remotely
piloted aircraft. These sales were authorized by the Israeli defense
ministry (Arie Egozi, "War in Georgia: The Israeli connection,"
Ynet, 10 August 2008).
Training also involved officers from Israel's Shin Bet secret service
-- which has for decades carried out extrajudicial executions and
torture of Palestinians in the occupied territories -- the Israeli
police, and the country's major arms companies Elbit and Rafael.
The Tel Aviv-Tbilisi military axis appears to have been cemented
at the highest levels, and according to YNet, "The fact that
Georgia's defense minister, Davit Kezerashvili, is a former Israeli
who is fluent in Hebrew contributed to this cooperation." Others
involved in the brisk arms trade included former Israeli minister
and Tel Aviv mayor Roni Milo as well as several senior Israeli military
officers.
The key liaison was Reserve Brigadier General Gal Hirsch who commanded
Israeli forces on the border with Lebanon during the July 2006 Second
Lebanon War. (Yossi Melman, "Georgia Violence - A frozen alliance,"
Haaretz, 10 August 2008). He resigned from the army after the Winograd
commission severely criticized Israel's conduct of its war against
Lebanon and an internal Israeli army investigation blamed Hirsch
for the seizure of two soldiers by Hizballah.
According to one of the Israeli combat trainers, an officer in
an "elite" Israel army unit, Hirsch and colleagues would
sometimes personally supervise the training of Georgian forces which
included "house-to-house fighting." The training was carried
out through several "private" companies with close links
to the Israeli military.
As the violence raged in Georgia, the trainer was desperately trying
to contact his former Georgian students on the battlefront via mobile
phone: the Israelis wanted to know whether the Georgians had "internalized
Israeli military technique and if the special reconnaissance forces
have chalked up any successes" (Jonathan Lis and Moti Katz,
"IDF vets who trained Georgia troops say war with Russia is
no surprise," Haaretz, 11 August 2008).
Yet on the ground, the Israeli-trained Georgian forces, perhaps
unsurprisingly overwhelmed by the Russians, have done little to
redeem the image of Israel's military following its defeat by Hizballah
in July-August 2006.
The question remains as to why Israel was involved in the first
place. There are several reasons. The first is simply economic opportunism:
for years, especially since the 11 September 2001 attacks, arms
exports and "security expertise" have been one of Israel's
growth industries. But the close Israeli involvement in a region
Russia considers to be of vital interest suggests that Israel might
have been acting as part of the broader US scheme to encircle Russia
and contain its reemerging power.
Since the end of the Cold War, the US has been steadily encroaching
on Russia's borders and expanding NATO in a manner the Kremlin considers
highly provocative. Shortly after coming into office, the Bush Administration
tore up the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and, like the Clinton
administration, adopted former Soviet satellite states as its own,
using them to base an anti-missile system Russia views as a threat.
In addition to their "global war on terror," hawks in
Washington have recently been talking up a new Cold War with Russia.
Georgia was an eager volunteer in this effort and has learned quickly
the correct rhetoric: one Georgian minister claimed that "every
bomb that falls on our heads is an attack on democracy, on the European
Union and on America." Georgia has been trying to join NATO,
and sent 2,000 soldiers to help the US occupy Iraq. It may have
hoped that once war started this loyalty would be rewarded with
the kind of round-the-clock airlift of weapons that Israel receives
from the US during its wars. Instead so far the US only helped airlift
the Georgian troops from Iraq back to the beleaguered home front.
By helping Georgia, Israel may have been doing its part to duplicate
its own experience in assisting the eastward expansion of the "Euro-Atlantic"
empire. While supporting Georgia was certainly risky for Israel,
given the possible Russian reaction, it has a compelling reason
to intervene in a region that is heavily contested by global powers.
Israel must constantly reinvent itself as an "asset" to
American power if it is to maintain the US support that ensures
its survival as a settler-colonial enclave in the Middle East. It
is a familiar role; in the 1970s and 1980s, at the behest of Washington,
Israel helped South Africa's apartheid regime fight Soviet-supported
insurgencies in South African-occupied Namibia and Angola, and it
trained right-wing US-allied death squads fighting left-wing governments
and movements in Central America. After 2001, Israel marketed itself
as an expert on combating "Islamic terrorism."
Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez recently denounced Colombia -
long one of the largest recipients of US military aid after Israel
-- as the "Israel of Latin America." Georgia's government,
to the detriment of its people, may have tried to play the role
of the "Israel of the Caucasus" -- a loyal servant of
US ambitions in that region -- and lost the gamble. Playing with
empires is dangerous for a small country.
As for Israel itself, with the Bush Doctrine having failed to give
birth to the "new Middle East" that the US needs to maintain
its power in the region against growing resistance, an ever more
desperate and rogue Israel must look for opportunities to prove
its worth elsewhere. That is a dangerous and scary thing.
Co-founder of The
Electronic Intifada, where this article first appeared, Ali
Abunimah is author of One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-
Palestinian Impasse (Metropolitan Books, 2006).
see also http://www.spectrezine.org/war/Georgia.htm